This is Part 2 of “The Dragon’s in
the Detail with ‘Chinese Kina’” – a two part series looking into China
EXIM Bank’s K6 billion loan to PNG. Part 1 can be found here and should be read prior to Part 2.
The revelation that the China EXIM Bank loan to PNG is actually a comprehensive credit package in the vicinity of K10 billion (US$5
billion) falls in line with EXIM’s strategic model of finance
associated with developing countries and best demonstrated by the bank’s
foraging into a number of African states.
Of relevant interest here is Angola’s 2007 US$4.5 billion credit package, Nigeria’s initially proposed 2009 US$2.5 billion credit package, and Ghana’s 2010 US$10.4 billion credit package
– all financed by China EXIM bank and intended for various
infrastructure projects – including railway, roads, dams and power
plants.
It is debateable whether this model of
developmental finance is indeed a genuine model of capital development
for developing countries, or simply a credit-package which undermines
the ability of these states to cope with debt – a fear some Papua New
Guineans hold.
But what is agreed though is that this
model is conducive to long-term objectives of developing countries,
largely because Chinese policy banks like EXIM, are state owned and
offer concessional loans which have long maturities and low-interest
rates – fiscal terms and conditions which are globally competitive
enough to trump that of both commerical and concessional loans offered
by other partners.
Based on EXIM’s experience in Africa, the OECD Development Centre reported that the bank’s concessional loan structure is guided – in general terms – by the following basic conditions:
“Chinese contractors must be awarded the infrastructure contract financed by the loan.This is similar to concessionary finance of traditional donors and provides these companies with an entry point to set up a presence in host markets where they can bid for commercial contracts, independent of projects under the concessional loan agreements.In principle, concessional loans are used for procuring equipment, materials, technology and services, with no less than 50 per cent of the contract’s procurement coming from China. The loan is denominated in Chinese Renminbi (RMB) and has a maximum maturity of 20 years.A grace period of 3-7 years may be granted to the borrower, during which the borrower will only repay interest payments and not the principal. The interest rate [between 3-6 per cent] is subsidised and underwritten by Chinese Government finances.”
It is likely that these terms and conditions will also apply to EXIM’s credit package to PNG too.
And to support the above, a precedent already exists between China EXIM Bank and PNG via the US$300 million Pacific Marine Industrial Zone (PMIZ) where the bank provided a US$71 million concessional loan for its construction in 2010.
Under this agreement, a relatively
unknown Chinese contractor called China Shenyang International was
awarded the contract as per the conditions of the loan.
These included the requirement
that 70 per cent of the project was to go exclusively to a Chinese
developer using Chinese technology, labour and equipment – while
restricting PNG firms to bid for the remaining 30 per cent.
In addition, China Shenyang
International’s profit margin was dictated to be 20 per cent of the
total contract value, while the loan structure included a grace period
of 5 years and a loan repayment time of 15 years.
As an indication of how sketchy details
surrounding EXIM’s conditions can be - former Minister for Commerce and
Industry Gabriel Kapris – when naming the the developer to construct
PMIZ, could not provide any further detail to the history, expertise or corporate profile of China Shenyang International – apart from the company’s name.
Although the questions of ’what on’ and
‘how’ EXIM’s K6 billion loan will be expended are important to PNG - and
must be answered and made public by Peter O’Neill - it really is
secondary to the the issue of what exactly are the terms of repayment.
One of the key issues of the K6 billion loan which has captivated PNG’s domestic discourse is the issue of affordability.
The Opposition in particular has repeatedly highlighted
this as a point of concern and have contended that the government has
pre-committed the gas revenue from the PNG LNG Project, due to be banked
into the State’s coffers in 2022, to pay back the loan.
But this doesn’t quite make sense under China EXIM Bank’s strategy.
What The Opposition and it seems
everybody has missed, and what I strongly suspect to be the case, is
that EXIM’s K6 billion loan will not be paid back via the regular
financial installments dictated in the standard terms and conditions of a
loan and disbursed through the budget process under the Department of
Treasury’s watch, but instead, it will be accommodated for through a
concessional commodity-for-finance agreement where the State will
provide China with a minumum daily supply of oil and/or LNG in exchange
for the financing of its expenditure objectives.
It’s an explosive conclusion - but one
that I’ve drawn logically given the rather bullish nature of the
government’s promotion of the loan in light of unanswered questions and a
reluctance to reveal key details.
(It’s either a commodity off-take
agreement or the commitment to provide stakes in a number of permits
containing undeveloped gas fields and in exploration permits as happened in Nigeria – I suspect the former).
Furthermore, it fits well with EXIM’s strategy.
One of the biggest hints to this possibility is Minister for Works Francis Awesa’s strong indication
of the participation of China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) –
China’s largest integrated energy company – in the EXIM Bank loan deal.
CNPC and Sinopec, China’s national oil corporation, are both state-owned enterprises that have signed comprehensive supply contracts with ExxonMobil as part of the PNG LNG Project; and both are beneficiaries of project assistance from EXIM too.
There would also be scope for this
arrangement to continue and intensify when InterOil’s US$7 billion LNG
project begins production in 2015 as another Chinese state-owned
enterprise, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), has signed a
Heads of Agreement
with InterOil and PNG’s Petromin regarding the possibility of
underwriting the project – or at the minimum, helping to finance the
State’s equity in the project.
In addition – more recently, InterOil-led joint-venture Liquid Niugini Gas Ltd signed a 15yr supply contract with China too.
Any such commodity off-take agreement
would be actioned through a joint venture arrangement with Petromin –
PNG’s natinal oil, gas and minerals company, and be cushioned by the
initial grace period provided by EXIM.
China EXIM Bank’s financing strategy that
couples a commodity off-take agreement with the financing of
infrastructure is known as the ‘Angola Model’.
Examples abound here with Angola paying
its debt to China back with oil exports, Gabon with iron ore, Demoractic
Republic of Congo with copper and cobalt, and Guinea with Bauxite.
Several of these arrangements are current.
But there are some serious concerns with China EXIM Bank and its ‘Angola Model’.
Perhaps the best example is that of Nigeria which was to draw down US$2.5 billion from EXIM in 2009.
After the country transisitioned through elections, it was revealed by the incoming government
that what was initially thought to be a US$2.5 billion concessionary
loan credit package turned out to be US$500 million at a concessionary
rate, and the remaining US$2 billion at EXIM’s commercial rate.
Furthermore, it has been recently
revealed that PNG’s loan structure with EXIM regarding Madang’s PMIZ
consists of highly controversial detail.
Perhaps most shocking is the revelation
that the entire agreement entered into between the two parties,
although signed and actioned in PNG, is to be “governed by and construed
in accordance with the laws of China”.
It doesn’t bode well for Peter O’Neill and the EXIM’s K6 billion loan.
As more details of the concessional loan
emerge (Works Minister Francis Awesa is due in China later this month to
finalize the deal), we may be looking at another of
“the well-priced ‘long term trade agreements’ or deferred payment,
resource-backed commercial export credits, where the interest rate will
be based on LIBOR plus a margin”.
Peter O’Neill must make public the terms
and conditions surrounding the China EXIM Bank loan, and the fiscal
strategies his government will use to manage and mitigate the risks
associated with the loan.
These basic details and conditions of the
loan structure need to be made transparent – its importance to PNG
requires that this be the case.
At the end of the day, the buck stops
with Peter O’Neill and Co to refuse loans that are not concessionary by
nature, as the Dragon is indeed in the detail with ‘Chinese Kina’.
The Garamut PNG
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